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Abstract
The growth in multilateral working relationships (e.g. agency work, chains of sub-contracting and
corporate groups) is causing Member States to increasingly scrutinise their traditional, contractual
approach to the notion of ‘employer’. So far, little attention has been paid to the boundaries and
limits that EU law sets when defining the employer. The lack of attention may have come to an end
with the recent AFMB judgment, in which the Court ruled, for the first time, that the concept of
employer in a provision of EU law had to be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation
throughout the EU. Starting from the AFMB judgment, the author analyses the concept of employer
in EU law. The author finds that the concept of employer in EU law can be described as ‘uniform in
its functionality’: in EU law, the national concept of the employer is never absolute, but the cir-
cumstances and the way in which the national concept must be set aside depend on the context
and the objective of the European legislation in question. Through this functional approach, EU law
partly harmonises the various national approaches to the concept of the employer. Nevertheless, a
lack of specific reasoning on the part of the Court may grant the Member States considerable
leeway to uphold their own views on the concept.
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Introduction
Defining the concept of the ‘employee’ is an age-old legal problem. The flip side of that problem,
namely the question of who should be considered the ‘employer’ of the respective employee, has
historically received far less attention. The lack of attention stems from a traditional, singular
perception of the employer: the employer is the entity with whom the employee has concluded the
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employment contract. Today’s reality, however, is far more complex. An increasing number of
work arrangements (e.g. agency work, corporate groups and chains of sub-contracting) involve a
multitude of parties in the employment relationship. As a result, the legal nature of the employer
has emerged as an issue of its own right1 and legal scholars and policymakers are increasingly
scrutinising or even rethinking their approach to the concept of employer.2 So far, this thought
exercise has mostly been a national one. In stark contrast with the concept of the employee – over
which the influence of EU law is widely recognised – little attention has been paid to the require-
ments and boundaries that EU law sets when defining the employer. The lack of attention is
understandable, since the number of judgments the Court of Justice of the EU (hereafter: ‘the
Court’) has devoted to the worker concept far outweighs its judgments on the notion of the
employer.3 However, in its recent decision in the case of AFMB Ltd and Others v Raad van bestuur
van de Sociale verzekeringsbank4 (hereafter: ‘AFMB’) the Court considered, for the first time, how
the concept of the employer in EU law is to be understood on a more fundamental level.
Various social policy Directives, like the Working Time Directive,5 the Collective Redundan-
cies Directive6 and the recent Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions,7
connect certain rights or obligations to the status of ‘employer’. As a result, EU law has the
potential to limit the autonomy of the Member States to (re)define the employer. This contribution
therefore explores the engagement of EU law with the concept of employer and analyses the
contents of the concept of employer in EU law. The AFMB judgment is taken as the starting point,
followed by an analysis of that judgment in a wider context. The analysis is threefold. First, the
criteria for employership set out by the Court in AFMB are scrutinised. Next, the extent to which
these criteria can be exported to other parts of the EU social acquis is examined, i.e. the extent to
which the Court has created a uniform definition of the employer throughout EU law. Finally, it is
discussed what room the EU approach to the concept of employer leaves the Member States to
maintain or adopt a diverging definition of the employer when applying or implementing EU law.
Throughout the analysis, the relation between AFMB and earlier Court rulings on the concept of the
employer is discussed. Moreover, references are made to various diverging concepts of employer
in national law. The latter exercise aims to illustrate the potential impact of the EU approach to the
notion of the employer on Member States. The contribution does not, however, aim to give a
comprehensive overview of the concept of employer in all 27 Member States.
1. This was already noted by Deakin in 2001: Deakin, S. (2001), ‘The Changing Concept of the ‘Employer’ in Labour
Law’, Industrial Law Journal (30), p. 72.
2. For recent studies on the notion of employer, see Prassl, J. (2015), The concept of the employer (Oxford, OUP); Corazza,
L. & Razzolini, O. (2015), ‘Who is an Employer’, WP CSDLE ‘Massimo D’Antona’.INT–109/2014; Blanpain, R. &
Hendrickx, F. (eds.) (2017), The Notion of Employer in the Era of the Fissured Workplace (Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer
Law International B.V.); Countouris, N. & De Stefano, V. (2019), New trade union strategies for new forms of
employment (Brussels, ETUC), pp. 61-63; Eindrapport van de Commissie Regulering van Werk (2020), In wat voor land
willen wij werken? Naar een nieuw ontwerp voor de regulering van werk, pp. 42-44, 72-76. See also Italian Labour Law
e-Journal 2020 (13) 1, a special issue dedicated to the concept of employer.
3. The most famous example of the latter being Case C-242/09, ECLI: EU: C:2010:625 (Albron), where the Court
created the concept of the ‘non-contractual employer’ for the sake of the Transfer of Undertaking Directive
(Directive 2001/23/EC).
4. Case C-610/18, ECLI: EU: C:2020:565 (AFMB).
5. Directive 2003/88/EC.
6. Directive 98/59/EC.
7. Directive (EU) 2019/1152.
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This contribution does not, as such, discuss the employer status of platforms. The question of
the extent to which platforms can be qualified as employers (in EU law or otherwise) requires an
in-depth analysis of the many different characteristics and modalities of platform work.8 Such an
analysis goes beyond the scope of this contribution.
AFMB
Factual background and questions referred
The AFMB judgment deals with the application of Regulation 883/2004 on the coordination of
social security systems9 to the so-called (and in the Netherlands somewhat notorious)10 ‘Cyprus
route’ scheme. In short, the Cyprus route scheme involves the intermediation of a Cypriot com-
pany, who concludes employment contracts with workers residing in the Netherlands and then
places them at the disposal of Dutch companies. The Cyprus route scheme aimes to bring the
workers under the scope of Cypriot law. As the level of social protection in Cyprus is relatively
low, this leads to significant cost savings, including social security contributions.11 To this end, the
Cypriot company AFMB entered into contracts with several Dutch transport companies and lorry
drivers resident in the Netherlands. AFMB made each driver available to one of the Dutch transport
companies for an indefinite period of time. The driver was recruited in the Netherlands by the
Dutch transport company or was in paid employment with that company before being engaged by
AFMB. On its website, AFMB advertises its services, inter alia, as a means for transport compa-
nies to cut costs and gain a competitive advantage.12
From a social security perspective, AFMB based the applicability of Cypriot law on Article
13(1)(b) Regulation 883/2004. The drivers in question were employed in various EU and EFTA
Member States and did not perform substantial activities in their Member State of residence (the
Netherlands). In this situation, Article 13(1)(b) refers to the social security system of the Member
State where the registered office of the ‘employer’ is situated. As the explicit counterparty to the
employment contracts, the Cypriot company AFMB contended that Cypriot social security law
8. For such endeavours, see Prassl, J. & Risak, M. (2016), ‘Uber, taskrabbit, and co.: Platforms as employers? Rethinking
the legal analysis of crowdwork’, Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal (37); Risak, M. (2018), ‘Fair Working
Conditions for Platform Workers: Possible Regulatory Approaches at the EU Level’, available at https://library.fes.de/
pdf-files/id/ipa/14055.pdf, pp. 10, 15-16; De Stefano, V. & Wouters, M. (2019), ‘Triangulaire arbeidsrelaties in de
platformeconomie: een voorstel tot een vermoeden van uitzendbureau’, Arbeidsrechtelijke Annotaties (18); see also
Hauben, H., Lenaerts, H. & Kraatz, S. (2020), ‘Platform economy and precarious work: Mitigating risks’, Policy
Department for Economic, Scientific and Quality of Life Policies. Directorate-General for Internal Policies, PE.
652.721, p. 8.
9. Regulation (EC) No 883/2004. The Court clarified that the considerations in AFMB apply equally to the predecessor of
Regulation 883/2004, Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71, which still applied to the EFTA States during the time in which
the lorry drivers performed part of their work there. Regulation 1408/71 was not discussed further here.
10. For the various legal techniques used by Dutch courts to deal with the Cyprus route scheme prior to the accession of
Cyprus to the EU, see Van den Berg, L. (2015), ‘Concernwerkgeverschap in de werknemersverzekeringen’, in: Beltzer,
R.M., Laagland, F.G. & Van den Berg, L., Concernwerkgeverschap, Preadvies Levenbach/VvA (Deventer, Kluwer),
p. 142 ff.
11. Originally, the Cyprus route scheme had a fiscal background; Roks, E.C.N. (1984), ‘De Cyprusconstructie exit’,
Weekblad Fiscaal Recht (5646), p. 868 ff.
12. https://www.afmb.eu. See also European Parliament, Parliamentary questions 23 February 2016, Question for written
answer E-001515/2016 to the Commission, Agnes Jongerius (S&D), PE 577.847.
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applied to the drivers. However, the Raad van bestuur van de Sociale verzekeringsbank (Board of
Management of the Dutch Social Insurance Bank) decided differently. It considered that the Dutch
transport companies, not AMFB, were the employers of the drivers within the meaning of Article
13(1)(b), with the result that Dutch social security legislation applied. After an unsuccessful appeal
by AFMB before the Amsterdam District Court, the Centrale Raad van Beroep (Dutch Higher Social
Security and Civil Service Court, hereafter: ‘CRvB’) held that the applicable social security law
depends on the interpretation of the concept of ‘employer’ in Article 13(1)(b) and referred three
preliminary questions to the Court. The CRvB asked, firstly, who should be considered to be the
employer within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b): the contractual employer, AFMB, or the transport
company, at whose disposal, according to the CRvB, the driver was entirely, and which recruited the
driver, exercised actual authority over the driver and which bore the actual wage costs. Secondly, if
AFMB was to be considered the employer, the CRvB inquired whether the requirements laid down in
Article 12(1) Regulation 883/2004 could be applied by analogy to Article 13(1)(b). Article 12(1)
concerns a different situation (temporarily posting a worker to another Member State) and requires 1)
an organic link between the employer and the worker and 2) that the employer carries out significant
activities in the Member State of establishment.13 The CRvB thought that, if it could apply these
criteria by analogy to Article 13(1)(b), it could reject the applicability of Cypriot law due to the lack
of an organic link between AFMB and the drivers.14 Thirdly, if AFMB were to be considered the
employer and the additional criteria could not be applied by analogy, the CRvB asked whether
Article 13(1)(b) could be disapplied on the ground that the use of the Cyprus route scheme con-
stituted abuse of EU law, as the sole objective was to bring workers under the scope of Cypriot social
security law via the connecting factor of the ‘employer’.
Opinion of Advocate General Pikamäe
In his elaborate and worthwhile Opinion,15 Advocate General Pikamäe addressed all three ques-
tions referred by the CRvB. He remarked that the concept of employer is not defined by Regulation
883/2004, nor does it expressly refer to the law of the Member States to define the employer. As a
result, the uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality require that the concept of
employer must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation, by taking into account the
context of Article 13(1)(b) and the objective of Regulation 883/2004. A uniform interpretation is
all the more necessary, since the notion of employer in Article 13(1)(b) is the connecting factor that
aims to determine a single State’s social security legislation as the applicable law. The Advocate
General considered that the employer should be identified on the basis of a case-by-case examina-
tion of all relevant circumstances and by using objective criteria. Relying solely on the existence of
a contractual relationship would not take due account of the complexity of today’s working
relationships and would risk circumvention of the objective conflict of law system established
by Regulation 883/2004.
To identify the relevant criteria, the Advocate General focused on establishing an employment
relationship. He remarked that to date the Court has paid more attention to the role of ‘worker’ than
to the role of ‘employer’. Nevertheless, he reasoned that the interpretation of the worker concept is
13. See e.g. Case C-202/97, ECLI: EU: C:2000:75 (FTS).
14. CRvB 20 September 2019, ECLI: NL: CRVB:2018:2878, paras. 7.2.2-7.2.3.
15. Opinion of Advocate General Pikamäe in the AFMB case (ECLI: EU: C:2019:1010) (hereafter: ‘AFMB (Opinion)’).
366 European Labour Law Journal 12(3)
equally relevant when identifying the employer, since being a worker necessarily implies the
existence of a hierarchical relationship with an employer. To determine the existence of a hier-
archical relationship and, thus, the identity of the employer, the Advocate General drew inspiration
from the Court’s case law on social security law, employment relationships generally and private
international law. In the Court’s case law on the coordination of social security, the Advocate
General found that one must look at the worker’s actual employment situation and not merely at
the contractual documents. Specifically, the Advocate General inferred from the Court’s ruling in
Manpower16 (which concerned the aforementioned ‘organic link’ in the predecessor17 of Article
12(1) Regulation 883/2004) that the employer is the party who is responsible for engaging the
worker, paying his salary and sanctioning and dismissing him. From the Court’s case law on
employment relationships, the Advocate General inferred that a hierarchical relationship is char-
acterised by factual powers of management and supervision. Moreover, he referred to the Albron
ruling in which the Court held (for the purpose of the Transfer of Undertaking Directive) that the
undertaking to which a worker is posted may be an employer despite the absence of a contractual
relationship.18 Finally, he found further support for an objective approach in the Court’s case law
on private international law. Specifically, he referred to the Court’s ruling in Voogsgeerd,19 where
the Court held that, when assessing whether a company is the employer which engaged the worker,
which is a connecting factor to determine the applicable employment law in Article 8 Rome I
Regulation,20 the national court must consider all the objective factors to assess whether the actual
employment status differs from the terms of the contract. These viewpoints led the Advocate
General to conclude that the contractual relationship between the drivers and AFMB was only
indicative in nature and that the identity of the employer should reflect the reality of the employ-
ment relationship. On the basis of the findings of the CRvB – the driver was fully available to the
Dutch transport company, which determined his engagement, working conditions, activities and
dismissal, bore the actual wage costs and was often the employer of the driver before the involve-
ment of AFMB – the Advocate General concluded that the power of management and supervision
lay with the Dutch transport company who should therefore be considered to be the employer of
the driver within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b). Consequently, Dutch social security legislation
applied.
Considering that the Court may nonetheless identify AFMB as the employer, the Advocate
General also addressed the two other preliminary questions. As to the second question, he con-
cluded that in light of the aforementioned considerations there was no organic link between AFMB
and the drivers (without commenting on whether this criterion applies to Article 13(1)(b)). With
regard to the second criterion of Article 12 (significant activities in the Member State of estab-
lishment), the Advocate General remarked that it cannot be read into Article 13(1)(b), since, inter
alia, Article 13(1)(b) merely requires that the employer is established in that Member State. Thus,
the analogic approach suggested by the CRvB could not be followed. As to the third question, the
16. Case C-35/70, ECLI: EU: C:1970:120 (Manpower).
17. Council Regulation No 3 on social security for migrant workers, Art. 13(1)(a).
18. Supra n. 3. Both the EU legislator and the Court often equate the concept of ‘undertaking’ with the natural or legal
person that owns that undertaking (the entrepreneur). For the sake of consistency, this equation is followed throughout
this contribution. Nevertheless, it is clear that an undertaking cannot have the legal status of ‘employer’; only the
natural or legal person owning the undertaking can.
19. Case C-384/10, ECLI: EU: C:2011:842.
20. Regulation (EC) No 593/2008.
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Advocate General was inclined to conclude that the Cyprus route scheme abused EU law, since
AFMB would only formally fulfil the conditions attached to the status of ‘employer’ in Article
13(1)(b) and the intermediation of AFMB appeared to have had the aim of excluding the drivers
from the scope of Dutch social security legislation. Thus, in his view, even if AFMB were to be
considered the employer, AFMB could not rely on Article 13(1)(b) to establish a connection to
Cypriot social security law.
Judgment of the Court
The Court stressed that the main objective of Regulation 883/2004 is to ensure that only one social
security system applies to the employment contract. Since Regulation 883/2004 does not explicitly
leave it up to the Member States to define the employer, this objective, together with the require-
ments of the uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality, requires that the connecting
factor of the employer in Article 13(1)(b) must be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation.
This interpretation must be sought, taking into account the usual meaning of the employer as well as
the context of and the objective pursued by Regulation 883/2004. As to its usual meaning, the Court
found that the relationship between employer and employee implies the existence of a hierarchical
relationship. With regard to the context of the employer in Regulation 883/2004, the Court ruled that
the correct application of the Regulation requires that the institution concerned bases its findings on
the employed person’s actual situation, whatever the wording of the contractual documents. From its
case law on the ‘organic link’ of the posting provision it inferred that the employer is the undertaking
with the actual authority over the employee, which must be deduced from all the circumstances of the
employment concerned. Like the Advocate General, the Court referred to Manpower, where the
hierarchical relationship resulted from the fact that the employer paid the worker’s wages and could
dismiss the worker. On the basis of these considerations, the Court concluded that to identify the
employer it is necessary to take account of the objective situation of the worker and of all the
circumstances of the worker’s employment. Though the existence of a contractual relationship has
indicative value, it remains necessary to take account of how the obligations under that contract are
performed in practice. Accordingly, it is necessary to identify which entity exercises the actual
authority over the worker, bears the actual wage costs and has the actual power to dismiss the
worker. The decision to opt for a factual rather than a contractual approach is supported by the
objectives of Regulation 883/2004, as it ensures that the workers are subject to the legislation of one
single Member State, prevents abuse of the connecting factor of the ‘employer’, and leads to legal
certainty. Finally, like the Advocate General, the Court inferred from the findings of the CRvB that,
although it was for the referring court to determine, the Dutch transport companies seemed to be the
respective employers of the drivers within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b) Regulation 883/2004, with
the result that Dutch social security legislation applied.
As the Dutch transport companies appeared to be the employers of the drivers, the Court saw no
need to answer the second and third question.
The definition of employer in AFMB
General remarks
AFMB was the first case – with regard to Regulation 883/2004 or otherwise – in which the Court
explicitly decided that the concept of employer in a provision of EU law must be given an
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autonomous and uniform interpretation. The choice for a uniform concept in Regulation 883/2004
is logical. As both the Advocate General and the Court emphasised, allowing Member States to
maintain their own approach to the employer would jeopardise the primary objective of Regulation
883/2004, to ensure that a worker is subject to the social security system of no more and no less
than one Member State. Allowing diverging interpretations of the concept of the employer for the
purpose of Regulation 883/2004 could lead to the conclusion that there are multiple employers
(e.g. AFMB in Cypriot law and the Dutch transport company in Dutch law), with the result that the
connecting factor of the employer would refer to multiple social security systems and the Dutch
transport company would be liable for the same social security contributions in the Netherlands as
AFMB would be in Cyprus. In this light, it is hardly surprising that the European legislator did not
leave it up to the Member States to define the concept of employer in Regulation 883/2004.
To establish a hierarchical relationship, the Court focused on identifying the entity that exer-
cises the actual authority over the worker, actually bears the relevant wage costs and has the actual
power to dismiss that worker.21 The element of ‘authority’ is to be interpreted broadly and must be
deduced from all the circumstances of the employment concerned. It is not limited to exercising
the power of direction and supervision, but also encompasses questions such as who recruited the
worker and who can in fact use the worker.22 The two other elements, paying wages and having the
power of dismissal, seem to stem from the Court’s reference to Manpower, where it found that a
hierarchical relationship for the purpose of the organic link-criterion resulted from these two
elements.23 Interestingly, in a different case, the Court held that Manpower was, in fact, about
establishing ‘authority’.24 With this in mind, the weight that is to be attached to the Court’s
separate mention of paying wages and having the power of dismissal should not be overstated.
These circumstances are not on equal footing with, and can even be seen as a part of, the more
comprehensive notion of authority. This view is supported by the Court’s emphasis that it is
necessary to take account of all the circumstances of the worker’s employment25 and that, whilst
assessing the circumstances in AFMB, no single circumstance (including the payment of wages and
the power of dismissal) seemed to carry more or fewer weight than another.26
Thus, identifying the employer within the meaning of Article 13(1)(b) Regulation 883/2004
requires an assessment of all relevant circumstances. This holistic approach inevitably begs the
question of how the employer should be identified if not all circumstances point towards the same
entity. This question did not arise in AFMB, since all material employer functions were exercised
by the Dutch transport companies. However, in practice, the circumstances are often less unequi-
vocal. Employer functions are shared by multiple entities on a regular basis.27 The question is
whether the holistic ‘AFMB test’ can be given a more specific interpretation and whether some
circumstances carry more weight than others. In this regard, three observations are made. These
observations concern the relevance of the Court’s case law on the concept of the worker (section
3.2), the guidance that may be inferred from European Directives on multilateral working relation-
ships (section 3.3) and the significance of abuse (section 3.4).
21. AFMB, para. 80. See also paras. 61, 75.
22. AFMB, paras. 55, 77-78.
23. AFMB, para. 56.
24. FTS (supra n. 13), para. 24, to which the Court refers in AFMB, para. 55.
25. AFMB, paras. 52-60.
26. AFMB, paras. 76-80.
27. See supra n. 2.
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Blurring the boundaries between the concept of ‘worker’ and the concept of ‘employer’
A first observation concerns the question of the extent to which the Court’s comprehensive case
law on the concept of the worker may be of use when identifying the employer. It is clear from his
Opinion in AFMB, that Advocate General Pikamäe favours an analogic approach. He reasoned that
the worker question and the employer question are essentially the same: the counterparty to the
hierarchical relationship that is necessary to grant a person worker status (commonly referred to as
‘subordination’) is the employer of that worker. The Court did not explicitly follow or refer to this
line of thought. This might imply that the Court regards the worker question and the employer
question as two separate matters entirely. However, there is logic in the Advocate General’s
approach. In national law, although establishing the status of ‘employee’ and ‘employer’ regularly
constitute separate tests, the two tests often converge significantly.28 Similarly, from an EU law
perspective there is little reason why the comprehensive guidance of the Court on the notion of
subordination cannot be of use when identifying the employer. For example, questions like
whether the working person shares in the economic risk of the entity and is incorporated into the
undertaking of that entity, which are relevant factors to establish subordination,29 can be regarded
as equally relevant (after establishing that the working person is indeed a worker) to assess the
employer status of that entity in case of multiple candidates.
The worker criteria cannot, however, be applied to the employer concept one-on-one. The
worker concept revolves around establishing the existence of a hierarchical relationship in a
bilateral relationship. In contrast, an overly literal application of the worker criteria to the employer
concept in a multilateral relationship could lead to the conclusion that there are multiple employ-
ers: on the basis of the worker criteria, every entity in a multiparty working arrangement, under
whose direction a worker works for remuneration, could be considered to be an employer of that
worker. This reasoning was used recently by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal.30 The case revolved
around the question of whether a Dutch mother company qualified as the ‘employer’ of the
employees of its Spanish daughter company within the meaning of Dutch insolvency law. This
question mattered, since Dutch insolvency law grants employee claims a preferential status in the
case of insolvency of their employer.31 The Court of Appeal drew inspiration from the Court’s
worker criteria and concluded that, besides the hierarchical relationship between the employees
and the Spanish daughter company, a hierarchical relationship had also existed between the
employees and the Dutch mother company. As a result, the Spanish and the Dutch company
qualified as co-employers for the sake of Dutch insolvency law. Regardless of the merits of this
particular case, it is important to point out that the Advocate General did not apply the worker
criteria in this manner in AFMB. The definition of employer in AFMB revolved around identifying
the one, ‘true’ employer. In AFMB, the existence of a hierarchical relationship was clear, but the
question was to which of two distinct candidates that single hierarchical relationship could be
attributed. The question is, as it were, to whom, in a situation in which several entities exercise
28. Corazza & Razzolini (supra n. 2), p. 8; Jansen, C.J.H. (2002), ‘Het ontstaan van een arbeidsovereenkomst: de Hoge
Raad op het scherp van de snede’, Arbeidsrechtelijke Annotaties (1), p. 48.
29. E.g. Case C-3/87, ECLI: EU: C:1989:650 (Agegate), para. 36; Case C-22/98, ECLI: EU: C:1999:419 (Becu), para. 26.
See, for an overview, Risk, M. & Dullinger, T. (2018), The concept of ‘worker’ in EU law. Status quo and potential for
change (Brussels, ETUI), para. 2.7.
30. Amsterdam Court of Appeal 12 November 2019, ECLI: NL: GHAMS:2019:4062.
31. Art. 40(2) Dutch Insolvency Act; Art. 3:288(e) Dutch Civil Code.
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some kind of authority over the employee, that authority can primarily be attributed. When
answering this question, the Court’s guidance on the notion of subordination may be of use. The
criteria for employership in AFMB do not, however, lead to the conclusion that there are multiple
employers for one and the same obligation.32
Guidance in the Temporary Agency Work Directive and the Posted Workers Directive
Inspiration as to how to interpret the criteria for employer status as set out in AFMB can also be
drawn from European Directives that regulate triangular working relationships. These Directives
reflect the recognition in many Member States33 that, even though there is only one legal
employer, some employer functions can be shared by multiple entities. Besides the posting pro-
vision in Article 12 Regulation 883/2004, from which the Court drew heavy inspiration in
AFMB,34 the most prominent examples are the Temporary Agency Work Directive35 (hereafter:
‘TAWD’) and the Posted Workers Directive36 (hereafter: ‘PWD’). In short, both Directives aim to
strike a balance between worker protection and the legitimate use of flexible work by creating a
suitable regulatory framework for triangular employment relationships.37 They do not define the
employer, but offer a clear indication that in triangular working arrangements the contractual
employer is the legal employer. This indication is best illustrated by the explicit objective of the
TAWD to recognise temporary work agencies as employers.38 With this in mind, AFMB can be
given a more specific interpretation by taking a closer look at the working arrangements that are
regulated in these Directives. It seems likely that in a situation which is covered by either the
TAWD or the PWD – and which is thus seen as a legitimate triangular working relationship at the
EU level – the AFMB test identifies the contractual employer as the employer.
The TAWD applies to any natural or legal person who engages workers in order to assign them
to another undertaking to work there temporarily under the supervision and direction of that
undertaking.39 Similarly, in a cross-border context the PWD applies to the temporary posting of
a worker to another undertaking in another Member State to work under the control and direction
of that undertaking.40 It can be inferred from these definitions that delegating the power of (work-
related)41 supervision and direction to another entity is legitimate, and that workers may even be
engaged for the purpose of being assigned,42 on the condition that the assignment is of a temporary
32. This does not imply there can never be two employers in EU law. See infra para. 4.
33. Corazza & Razzolini (supra n. 2), pp. 5-7; Blanpain & Hendrickx (eds.) (supra n. 2). A similar recognition flows from
ILO Convention 181 (1997), see De Stefano & Wouters (supra n. 8), pp. 15-16.
34. In fact, it can be inferred from AFMB that the existence of an ‘organic link’ entails that the undertaking making the
posting is, and remains to be, the ‘true’ employer during the period of posting.
35. Directive 2008/104/EC.
36. Directive 96/71/EC, as amended by Directive (EU) 2018/957.
37. Preamble 9-12 TAWD; Preamble 5-6, 13 PWD. The TAWD defines a general framework applicable to the working
conditions of temporary agency workers; the PWD regulates which law applies to the employment contract of cross-
border posted workers.
38. Art. 2 TAWD.
39. Art. 3(1)(b) TAWD.
40. Art. 1(3)(c) PWD; see also Case C-18/17, ECLI: EU: C:2018:904 (Danieli), para. 27 and case law cited.
41. In general, two types of employer directions can be distinguished: work-related directions and disciplinary directions.
Temporary agency work concerns the delegation of the power of work-related direction.
42. See also Manpower (supra n. 16), para. 14.
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nature.43 As a result, when identifying the employer, not too much weight can be attached to the
circumstance that the power of work-related control and direction is not exercised by the con-
tractual employer. Moreover, the occurrence of a (genuine) situation of temporary agency work
offers a strong presumption that the contractual employer is the legal employer. In that case, the
‘indicative value’44 of the employment contract is high and questions, like who bears the actual
wage costs45 and who has the actual power of dismissal, carry less weight, i.e. are insufficient to
rebut the presumption that the temporary work agency is the employer. On the other hand, if the
assignment does not have a temporary, but a permanent, character, this can be seen as a strong
indication that the employer status of the contractual employer does not reflect the reality of the
employment relationship.46 Permanently assigning an employee to one user undertaking usually
gives that undertaking a high degree of authority over that employee. It will often have the actual
power of dismissal and bear the actual wage costs. Thus, when identifying the true employer, the
temporary or permanent nature of an assignment carries considerable weight.47
The situation is clearer in the case of contracting. Contracting is another type of posting which
falls under the scope of the PWD. It differs from temporary agency work in the sense that the
employees are not assigned to a user undertaking to work there under the control and direction of
that undertaking. Instead, the contractual employer continues to manage the employees within his
own labour process and subsequently provides a service to the user undertaking.48 Employees who
move with their employer in a contracting situation do not fall under the scope of the TAWD and
are granted less protection than temporary agency workers in the PWD.49 The difference in
treatment flows from the circumstance that the employees do not work for the user undertaking,
but continue to perform their work within the undertaking of their contractual employer. By
extension, in cases of contracting the employee’s hierarchical relationship normally exists with
the contractual employer and not with the user undertaking. The traditional thought is that the
identity of the employer should coincide with the owner of the enterprise in which work is
performed.50 As Coase states in his highly influential The Nature of the Firm, the fact of direction
43. Moreover, it seems irrelevant whether the assignment occurs outside or within a corporate group. As regards the PWD,
the Court held in the Danieli case (supra n. 40) that intra-group posting is a special type of agency work to which the same
criteria apply. There is no reason to assume this is different for the TAWD. See, in more detail, e.g. Laagland, F.G. & Van
Braak, M.J. (2020), ‘Uitzending en tijdelijkheid: onlosmakelijk verbonden of niets gemeen?’, Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid
(13) 3, pp. 10-11; Hamann, W. (2011), ‘Die Reform des AÜG im Jahr 2011’, Recht der Arbeit (12), p. 333.
44. Cf. AFMB, para. 61; AFMB (Opinion), para. 57.
45. Cf. Art. 1(2) TAWD, which declares the Directive applicable to temporary-work agencies and user undertakings
‘whether or not they are operating for gain’.
46. This view is supported by Art. 6 TAWD, which has as its purpose that a temporary agency worker is eventually
engaged by the user undertaking, and by the Albron ruling (see para. 4.2. infra). See also Case C-681/18, ECLI: EU:
C:2020:823 (KG), in which the Court held that the TAWD obliges the Member States to take measures to preserve the
temporary nature of agency work.
47. It can be deduced, inter alia, from the Rome I Regulation, TAWD and PWD that the notion of ‘temporariness’ revolves
around the objective of the assignment. In short, as long as the employer expects the worker to work elsewhere after the
assignment with the user undertaking, the assignment of that worker to that user undertaking is of a temporary nature.
48. Art. 1(3)(a) PWD; Danieli (supra n. 40), para. 27 and case law cited; cf. Bartkiw T.J. (2014), ‘Labour Law and Tri-
angular Employment Growth: A Theory of Regulatory Differentials’, The International Journal of Comparative
Labour Law and Industrial Relations (30), pp. 414-415.
49. Art. 3(1b) PWD.
50. Corazzo & Razzolini (supra n. 2), pp. 4-5, 13-14 and sources cited; Eindrapport van de Commissie Regulering van
Werk (supra n. 2), p. 42.
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can be seen as the essence of the legal concept of employer and employee, just as it is in the
economic concept of the enterprise.51 As a general principle, if the legal entity that exercises the
entrepreneurial power of control and direction over the working activity coincides with the legal
entity that is formally part of the employment contract, then it is this entity that should be regarded
as the employer.52 In that case, the question of who bears the wage costs and who has the power of
dismissal is less relevant – even less so than with regard to temporary agency work. The main
challenge in the case of contracting is ascertaining whether the employee has indeed remained
within the labour process of his contractual employer and is not in fact working within the labour
organisation (and, thus, under the control and direction) of the user undertaking, i.e. whether it is
not, in fact, a situation of agency work.53
The significance of abuse
The third observation concerns the notion of abuse. The Court did not answer the preliminary
question on whether the use of the Cyprus route scheme constituted an abuse of EU law. Never-
theless, it did address the notion of abuse, but as part of the assessment whether AFMB qualified as
the employer. As support for an objective approach, the Court considered that adopting a purely
formalistic approach would be irreconcilable with Regulation 883/2004, for this would make it
easier for employers to resort to purely artificial arrangements to exploit the Regulation.54 This
consideration raises the question of the weight that is attached to the notion of abuse when
identifying the employer.
Firstly, an abusive situation is not required to identify a user undertaking as the employer.
Abuse in the sense of EU law is limited to situations in which, despite formal observance of the
conditions laid down by EU law, the essential purpose of the arrangement is to obtain an undue
advantage.55 In contrast, in AFMB the Court based its findings on all the relevant circumstances.
This leaves room to pierce the contractual arrangement without the need to establish abuse. As an
example, one can point to the situation in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, the AFMB ruling has
important consequences. Dutch law expressly provides companies like AFMB, which engage
employees with the sole objective of placing them at the exclusive and permanent disposal of
another company, with a legal basis to act as the (sole) employer of the employees concerned.56 In
the Netherlands, this form of hiring out employees is known as ‘payrolling’. In some situations
(like in AFMB) the aim of a payrolling construction is to avoid employee-protective provisions of
labour law. The Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) ruled that in a case of abuse, the contractual
51. Coase, R.H., ‘The Nature of the Firm’, reprinted in Coase, R.H. (1988), The Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago,
University of Chicago Press), p. 54; Deakin (supra n. 1), p. 79.
52. See also Corazzo & Razzolini (supra n. 2), p. 5; Garofalo, D. (2020), ‘The identification of the employer in the context
of organisational fragmentation: the Italian legal framework’, Italian Labour Law e-Journal (13) 1, para. 1.
53. Eindrapport van de Commissie Regulering van Werk (supra n. 2), p. 74; Corazzo & Razzolini (supra n. 2), pp. 14-15
and sources cited; Lokiec, P. (2017), ‘Externalising the Workforce: Lessons from France’, in Ales, E., Deinert, O. &
Kenner, J. (eds.), Core and Contingent Work in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis (Oxford, Hart Pub-
lishing), p. 77; Garofalo (supra n. 52), para. 3.2.
54. AFMB, para. 69.
55. See AFMB (Opinion), para. 74 and case law cited. The general principle of the prohibition of abuse of EU law is seen
more often in the social acquis. Recent examples are Case C-359/16, ECLI: EU: C:2018:63 (Altun) (Regulation 883/
2004) and Case C-664/17, ECLI: EU: C:2019:496 (Ellinika Nafpigeia) (Transfer of Undertaking Directive).
56. Art. 7:692 Dutch Civil Code.
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arrangement must be pierced and the user undertaking must be considered to be the employer.57
However, outside the situation of abuse, Dutch law regards payrolling as a legitimate business
strategy. In contrast, it seems that even without an abusive aim, a payrolling company as described
above cannot be regarded as the employer within the meaning of AFMB, as most (if not all)
employer functions are exercised by the user undertaking.58 Thus, the AFMB test may identify
the user undertaking as the employer even if the arrangement is not abusive.
The flip side of the question is, if the aim of the multiparty arrangement is to reduce worker
protection, this automatically leads to the conclusion that the user undertaking is the employer.
This is not the case. Abuse (within the meaning of EU law) requires, inter alia, that the arrange-
ment only formally meets the conditions set out by EU law, i.e. that the contractual employer only
formally holds employer status.59 This criterion is not met if the contractual employer is the real
employer. In other words, even if the objective of the multilateral working arrangement is to reduce
worker protection, that arrangement does not constitute abuse within the meaning of EU law if the
contractual employer is the real employer.60 Nonetheless, establishing that the reduction of worker
protection is the essential aim of the contractual arrangement is undoubtedly an indication that the
employment contract does not reflect the reality of the employment relationship. Consequently, the
notion of abuse is one of the relevant elements the national court should take into account when
identifying the employer in Regulation 883/2004.
The concept of employer in EU law: uniformity versus functionality
The various definitions of ‘employer’ in EU law
The analysis in section 3 concerned the definition of employer within the meaning of Article
13(1)(b) Regulation 883/2004. An important question is to what extent that analysis can be
exported to other parts of the EU social acquis. Put differently, the question is to what extent the
Court created a definition of employer in AFMB that is uniform and autonomous throughout EU
law. To answer this question, it must be assessed, firstly, to what extent EU law engages with a
concept of ‘employer’ and to what extent defining that concept is an EU or a national competence.
The EU social acquis consists mostly of minimum Directives that have to be implemented with
regard of the conditions and technical rules in each of the Member States.61 As was already
mentioned in the introduction, various social policy Directives, like the Working Time Directive
or the Collective Redundancies Directive, connect certain rights or obligations to the status of
‘employer’. However, these Directives generally do not define the employer, nor do they expressly
57. Hoge Raad 21 February 2020, ECLI: NL: HR:2020:312.
58. Cf. Art. 4 Enforcement Directive (Directive 2014/67/EU), which stipulates that the PWD does not apply to employers
that only perform ‘purely internal management and/or administrative activities’. Many payrolling companies fit this
glove.
59. AFMB (Opinion), para. 74 and case law cited.
60. Cf. AFMB (Opinion), para. 40. The Court took a similar approach in Case C-327/92, ECLI: EU: C:1995:144 (Rheinhold
& Mahla). This case concerned the question whether a third-party liability of a main contractor was an ‘obligation of an
employer’ within the meaning of Regulation 1408/71 (now Art. 3(2) Regulation 883/2004). The Court answered this
question in the negative, but added that this could be different in case of fraud, which might be the case if the main
contractor was ‘in fact the true employer’ (para. 31).
61. Art. 153(2)(b) TFEU. Exceptions are the uniform, employment-related choice of law rules that are laid down in
Regulations like Regulation 883/2004 and the Rome I Regulation.
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refer to the law of the Member States to do so. Since Directives are only binding upon the Member
States as to the result to be achieved,62 one could argue that it is up to the Member States to
attribute the employer obligations laid down in social policy Directives, as long as they ensure
those obligations are fulfilled.63 This ‘hands-off’ approach to the concept of employer is clearly
reflected in the recent Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions. Although the
Directive acknowledges that several different entities may in practice assume the functions and
responsibilities of an employer, it explicitly leaves it up to the Member States to determine which
entity or entities should be held wholly or partly responsible for the employer obligations in the
Directive, as long as all those obligations are fulfilled.64 Interestingly, the Commission Proposal
contained a broad definition of the employer (‘one or more natural or legal person(s) who is or are
directly or indirectly party to an employment relationship with a worker’),65 but this definition was
removed from the Directive following negative advice from the European Committee of the
Regions; defining the employer was to remain a national matter.66 However, in AFMB the Court
clearly took a different approach. It is settled case law that the need for a uniform application of EU
law and the principle of equality require that a provision of EU law, which makes no express
reference to the law of the Member States to determine its meaning and scope, must normally be
given an independent and uniform interpretation throughout the EU. In AFMB, both the Court and
the Advocate General applied this formula to the employer concept. As this formula applies to
Regulations and Directives equally,67 it seems likely that in every social policy Directive that
connects certain rights or obligations to the status of ‘employer’, and which does not refer to the
law of the Member States to define the concept, that concept must normally be given a European
interpretation. This is even more likely since the Court has applied the same formula to give an
autonomous meaning to the worker concept, and has done so with increasing consistency in
different areas of EU law.68 Therefore, it is submitted that the AFMB ruling cannot be given a
narrow scope that is limited to Regulation 883/2004.
Nevertheless, not every Directive is silent on the notion of the employer. Some Directives, like
the aforementioned Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, do refer to the
law of the Member States to define the employer.69 The formula used in AFMB does not apply to
these Directives. Yet, this does not imply that these Directives do not in any way affect who is to be
regarded as an employer in the law of the Member State for the purposes of applying the rules laid
62. Art. 288 TFEU.
63. Van Schadewijk M.A.N. (2018), ‘Op zoek naar een visie op Europees werkgeverschap’, Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid
(11) 6, p. 10; Zwemmer, J.P.H. (2012), Pluraliteit van werkgeverschap (diss. Amsterdam UvA), pp. 42-45. This view is
supported by Art. 151 TFEU, which provides that EU social policy measure shall take account of the diverse forms of
national practices, ‘in particular in the field of contractual relations’.
64. Preamble 13 jo. Art. 1(5) Directive (EU) 2019/1152.
65. COM/2017/0797 final, Art. 2(1)(b).
66. Opinion of the European Committee of the Regions – Transparent and predictable working conditions in the European
Union (2018/C 387/10), Amendment 5.
67. E.g. Case C-201/13, ECLI: EU: C:2014:2132 (Deckmyn); Case C-485/17, ECLI: EU: C:2018:642 (Verbraucherzen-
trale Berlin).
68. E.g. Case C-147/17, ECLI: EU: C:2018:926 (Sindicatul Familia Constanţa), para. 41; Case C-692/19, ECLI: EU:
C:2020:288 (Yodel), para. 26. See in more detail Laagland, F.G. (2018), ‘Member States’ Sovereignty in the Socio-
Economic Field: Fact or Fiction?’, ELLJ (9), pp. 62-63.
69. Information and Consultation Directive (Directive 2002/14/EC), Art. 2(c); Insolvency Directive (Directive 2008/94/
EC), Art. 2(2).
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down in these Directives. Every Directive is binding, as to the result to be achieved, upon each
Member State. If the national concept of employer jeopardises the objective of a Directive, the
Member State has failed to implement it correctly. Through the preliminary ruling procedure, the
Court has the final say on the compatibility of these national interpretations with the purpose of
the Directive in question. In other words, the express reference to national law does not mean that
the Court may not step in and interpret the employer concept in these Directives autonomously. For
example, it cannot be excluded that the Court would interpret the concept of employer in the
Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions, despite the Directive’s express
reference to the law of the Member States. In support of this view, one can once again point to
the increasing tendency of the Court to adopt a uniform worker concept, even in Directives that
explicitly reserve the definition of the worker (or employee) to the domestic legal systems of the
Member States.70
Finally, the EU legislator has defined the term ‘employer’ on a number of occasions. Interest-
ingly, a first definition of the employer is found in Regulation 883/2004, the Regulation that was
under scrutiny in AFMB. Article 11(4) Regulation 883/2004 provides a lex specialis for the
determination of the social security law that is applicable to employed and self-employed sea-
farers. As the main rule, Article 11(4) refers to the law of the flag of the sea vessel. However, if the
seafarer’s Member State of residence and the Member State of the registered office of the employer
coincide, the social security law of that Member State applies. The employer is defined as ‘the
undertaking or person paying the [seafarer’s] remuneration’. Notions such as authority and a
hierarchical relationship are disregarded. This stands in stark contrast with the Court’s definition
of the employer in AFMB. Nevertheless, the sole focus on remuneration in Article 11(4) makes
sense. Article 11(4) applies equally to both employed and self-employed seafarers. Self-
employment is characterised by the absence of authority and a hierarchical relation. This leaves
remuneration as a suitable connecting factor. By extension, the definition of the employer in
Article 11(4) seems to be aimed at bringing every type of bilateral, maritime working relationship
under the scope of Article 11(4). In other words, the definition may not have been included to
attribute employer status in a multiparty arrangement.71 This would explain why the Court did not
refer to Article 11(4) in AFMB. Moreover, it opens the possibility that the AFMB criteria apply
equally, when identifying the employer of a seafarer in a multilateral working relationship, to
Article 11(4). In fact, adopting the objective, holistic AFMB test seems of particular relevance for
seafarers, since intermediary companies who act as employers on paper only are quite common to
this sector.72
Besides Article 11(4) Regulation 883/2004, there are two Directives in which the European
legislator has defined the employer. In the Framework Directive on Occupational Health and
Safety, the employer is defined as ‘any natural or legal person who has an employment relationship
70. Laagland (supra n. 68), pp. 62-63.
71. To the author’s knowledge, the legislative history of Regulation 883/2004 (or any of its predecessors) gives no gui-
dance on the matter.
72. Van der Voet, G. (2019), ‘International maritime employment law – About the special legal status of the most glo-
balised of international workers: the seafarer’, NIPR (36), p. 19; Christodoulou-Varotsi, I. (2009), ‘A Maritime
Competition Reading Of Regulation 1408/71/EC On The Co-Ordination Of Social Security Systems In The European
Union: Is The Current Regime Out-Of-Date?’, in: Antapassis, A., Athanassiou, L. & Erik Rosaeg, E. (eds.), Com-
petition and Regulation in Shipping and Shipping Related Industries (Leiden/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers), pp.
213-214.
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with the worker and has responsibility for the undertaking and/or establishment’.73 As an addi-
tional Directive, Directive 91/383, was adopted to ensure that hired workers (like temporary
agency workers) are given the same level of protection as workers employed by the user under-
taking,74 the employer definition seems to be aimed at the contractual employer.75 Secondly, the
Employers Sanctions Directive, which aims to combat the illegal employment of third-country
nationals, defines the employer as ‘any natural person or any legal entity, including temporary
work agencies, for or under the direction and/or supervision of whom the employment is under-
taken’.76 Like the employer definition in Article 11(4) Regulation 883/2004, this definition is not
aimed at attributing employer status in multiparty arrangements, but was included to cover every
type of employer, like private individuals in their capacity as employers of house cleaners.77
Moreover, the Employers Sanctions Directive explicitly defines both temporary work agencies
and subcontractors, and not the user undertaking, as employers.78 Like in the Framework Directive
on Occupational Health and Safety, this offers an indication that the European legislator had a
contractual concept of the employer in mind. The importance of these contractual definitions
should not, however, be overstated. The recognition of triangular working arrangements in both
Directives aims to ensure the protection of the workers in question. Therefore, it cannot be inferred
from these definitions that the European legislator actively wanted to limit the concept of employer
to the contractual counterparty to the employment contract.79 As a result, both Directives leave
ample room for the Court to interpret the definition of employer.80
The significance of the context and objective of the legislation in question
The preceding analysis shows that the Court has the final say over the meaning of the definition of
employer wherever it is used in EU law. Thus, in a way, the notion of employer in EU law can be
described as autonomous throughout EU law. However, this does not imply that the definition of
employer in every Directive mirrors the definition in AFMB. In AFMB both the Court and the
Advocate General made clear that, even if the employer concept must be given a European
meaning, that meaning must take into account the context and the objective of the specific
legislation concerned. As said, there was a clear need in AFMB to determine the identity of the
one ‘true’ employer, so as to ensure only one single social security system applied. The Court took
a similar approach in the Voogsgeerd case, which concerned the connecting factor of the ‘estab-
lishment which engaged the worker’ in Article 8 Rome I Regulation. To determine which
employer (and, therefore, which establishment) engaged the worker, the Court held that the
national court must consider all the objective factors to identify the actual employer. Since both
73. Directive 89/391/EEC, Art. 3(b).
74. Directive 91/383/EEG.
75. Idem Ales, E. (2017), ‘The ‘Risk Approach’ in Occupational Health and Safety (with an eye to Italy): Alternative or
Complement to the ‘Core/Contingent Approach’?’, in: Ales, Deinert & Kenner (eds.) (supra n. 53), p. 261; Zwemmer
(supra n. 63), pp. 43-44.
76. Directive 2009/52/EC, Art. 2(e).
77. COM(2007)249 final, p. 9.
78. Art. 2(e) jo. 8 Employers Sanctions Directive.
79. With regard to the Framework Directive on Occupational Health and Safety, Directive 91/383 makes this particularly
clear by attributing the core health and safety obligations to the user undertaking.
80. Though with regard to the Framework Directive on Occupational Health and Safety, the obligations Directive 91/383
puts on user undertakings arguably make an autonomous definition of the ‘employer’ unnecessary.
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Voogsgeerd and AFMB concerned the issue of a connecting factor that objectively determines
which single law system is applicable, it made sense to adopt an objective test in which the one,
true employer is identified. A similar approach is conceivable for Directives like the aforemen-
tioned Working Time Directive and Employers Sanctions Directive. It is logical to connect the
obligations of the ‘employer’ in these Directives to the entity who has the actual authority over the
worker, regardless of whether this entity is the contractual counterparty to the employment con-
tract, thereby strengthening the argument that the approach to the employer in AFMB is applicable
beyond Regulation 883/2004.
However, the same cannot be said of all EU social policy Directives. This is clearly illustrated
by the Albron case. This case concerned the question of whether a subsidiary of the Heineken
group could be regarded as the ‘transferor’ within the meaning of the Transfer of Undertaking
Directive in respect of employees who were permanently assigned to that subsidiary by another
subsidiary of the group. Article 2(1)(a) defines a transferor as ‘any natural or legal person who, by
reason of a transfer ( . . . ), ceases to be the employer in respect of the undertaking, business or part
of the undertaking or business’.81 The Court qualified the subsidiary to which the employees were
permanently assigned as the ‘non-contractual employer’ of the employees and considered that the
Transfer of Undertaking Directive does not necessarily require a contractual link with the trans-
feror for employees to benefit from its protection. Accordingly, as the non-contractual employer
was the owner of the transferred undertaking to which the employees were permanently assigned, it
had to be considered the ‘transferor’ in respect of those employees.
There are important differences between the approach in AFMB (and Voogsgeerd) and that in
Albron. In Albron, the Court did not identify the one ‘true’ employer but embraced the existence of
a non-contractual employer alongside a contractual employer. By extension, the non-contractual
employer status of the subsidiary of the Heineken group was not based on an objective assessment
of all relevant circumstances. Instead, it was sufficient that the employees were permanently
assigned there.82 As the context and the objective of the Transfer of Undertaking Directive differs
from that of Regulation 883/2004, these differences are unsurprising. The Transfer of Undertaking
Directive aims to protect employees in the event of a transfer of the economic entity in which they
perform their work. It is an example of legislation in which it is not the identity of the employer that
matters, but rather the link of the employee to the economic organisation (here: the economic
entity) within which work is performed.83 To establish this link, it is not necessary to assess
whether the owner of the economic entity is the employer of the employee, but rather that the
employee forms part of the economic entity. This criterion is met in case of permanent assignment.
In conclusion, the different context and objective of the Transfer of Undertaking Directive as
opposed to Regulation 883/2004 prevent the exportation of the employer definition in AFMB to
that Directive. Put differently, the Court’s interpretation of the employer in AFMB has not super-
seded the Albron ruling.
81. In some of the official language versions of the Directive (four out of thirteen), reference is not made to the ‘employer’
but to the ‘entrepreneur’. In Albron, the Court used both terms interchangeably.
82. It is submitted that the circumstance that the assignment occurred within a corporate group did not carry considerable
weight; cf. supra n. 43 and see in more detail e.g. Zwemmer (supra n. 63), pp. 210-212; Willemsen, H.J. (2011),
‘Erosion des Arbeitgeberbegriffs nach der Albron-Entscheidung des EuGH?’, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (64),
p. 1550.
83. Idem Corazzo & Razzolini (supra n. 2), pp. 4-5; Kühn, T. (2011), ‘Der Betriebsübergang bei Leiharbeit’, Neue
Juristische Wochenschrift (64), pp. 1410-1411.
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A functional approach
The preceding section shows that, although the concept of employer can be described as auton-
omous throughout EU law, there is no single definition of employer in EU law. Instead, the
definition of employer may, depending on the content and objective of the legal provision in
question, be different in different parts of EU law. As a result, different entities may be responsible
for different EU employer obligations.84 In other words, the approach to the employer in EU law is
a ‘functional’ or ‘purposive’ one. Though the exact extent of this functional approach remains to be
seen, it can be inferred from the abovementioned cases that account should be taken of whether the
legislation focuses on the identity of the ‘employer’ (in which case the AFMB criteria may come
into play) or on that of the ‘organisation’ in which work is performed. In the case of the latter, it is
not the establishment of authority that matters for the identification of the employer, but the
existence of a durable link between the worker and the organisation in question.
An example of how this functional approach could work in practice is found in the Collective
Redundancies Directive. This Directive obliges employers who are contemplating collective
redundancies to consult workers’ representatives with a view to try and prevent collective dis-
missals or to mitigate their social consequences. Whether redundancies must be regarded as
‘collective’ depends, inter alia, on the number of workers that are ‘normally employed’ in the
establishment where the redundancies take place.85 An important question is whether hired work-
ers (like agency workers), who are assigned to an establishment without being formally employed
by the owner of that establishment, count as workers ‘normally employed’ in that establishment. In
2017, the Bundesarbeitsgericht (German Supreme Court for labour law cases) referred this ques-
tion to the Court. In particular, it wondered whether agency workers would count as such if they
were assigned to the establishment on a permanent basis.86 Unfortunately, the questions were
withdrawn as the parties ended the procedure before the Bundesarbeitsgericht before the Court
could deliver its judgment.87 Nevertheless, on the basis of the functional concept of the employer
as set out above, it can be deduced that permanently assigned workers are indeed ‘normally
employed’ in the establishment of a user undertaking. The Court interprets the concept of ‘workers
normally employed in an establishment’ broadly, to ensure that atypical working arrangements are
not used to circumvent the Collective Redundancies Directive. Every worker, who is in fact
normally employed in an establishment, is to be counted.88 Moreover, the ‘establishment’ is
84. Another example of a functional approach is found in the cases Lawrence (Case C-320/00, ECLI: EU: C:2002:498) and
Allonby (Case C-256/01, ECLI: EU: C:2004:18). These cases concern the question whether, for the purposes of EU
equal treatment law, a comparison can be made between employees employed by different employers. The Court held
that the prohibition of discrimination is not limited to unequal treatment of employees who are employed by the same
employer. Instead, it is decisive whether the inequality can be attributed to a ‘single source’ that can restore equal
treatment. Although the Court interpreted the single source concept rather narrowly in both cases (see e.g. Fredman, S.
(2004), ‘Marginalising Equal Pay Laws’, Industrial Law Journal (33), pp. 281-282), it recognised that EU equality law
may pierce the identity of the contractual employer. However, this is a characteristic that is inherent to EU equal
treatment law. It prohibits, for example, not only discriminatory policies of employers but also discrimination that
flows directly from legislative provisions or collective labour agreements. Therefore, it is submitted that these cases do
not shed light on the interpretation of the concept of ‘employer’.
85. Art. 1(a)(i) Collective Redundancies Directive.
86. Bundesarbeitsgericht 16 November 2017, 2 AZR 90/17 (A); Request for a preliminary ruling from the Bunde-
sarbeitsgericht (Germany) lodged on 30 January 2018 (Case C-57/18).
87. Order of the President of the Court of 17 May 2018, Case C-57/18, ECLI: EU: C:2018:380.
88. Case C-422/14, ECLI: EU: C:2015:743 (Pujante Rivera), paras. 34-41 and case law cited.
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defined by the Court as the unit to which workers ‘are assigned to carry out their duties’.89 On the
basis of these considerations, it does not seem necessary that the owner of the establishment is the
legal employer of a worker for that worker to be ‘normally employed’ there. As with the Transfer
of Undertaking Directive, it is not the existence of a hierarchical relationship that matters, but the
link of the worker to the economic organisation (here: the establishment). Accordingly, the
approach in Albron can be exported to the Collective Redundancies Directive: workers who are
permanently assigned to an establishment can be attributed to that establishment and must there-
fore be considered to be ‘normally employed’ there.90
The significance of a functional definition of the employer in the Collective Redundancies
Directive does not end there. Besides the number of workers that are normally employed in the
establishment, the question of whether redundancies must be regarded as ‘collective’ depends on
the amount of redundancies in that establishment. Article 1(1)(a) of the Directive defines redun-
dancies as ‘dismissals effected by an employer for one or more reasons not related to the individual
workers concerned’. On the basis of this definition, the Bundesarbeitsgericht assumed in the
aforementioned German case that user undertakings cannot ‘dismiss’ agency workers within the
meaning of the Directive, even in case of permanent assignment, due to the absence of an employ-
ment contract between them.91 The correctness of this assumption may be doubted. On the basis of
the reasoning set out above, a user undertaking can be qualified as the ‘non-contractual’ employer
of permanently assigned workers for the purpose of the Collective Redundancies Directive.92
Secondly, the concept of ‘dismissal’ in EU law is not limited to formal terminations of the
employment contract. In recent years, the Court has extended the definition of dismissal to include
the situation in which an employer unilaterally makes significant changes to essential elements of
an employment contract.93 A similar approach is found in the Directive on Transparent and
Predictable Working Conditions, where ‘measures having equivalent effect’ are assimilated to
dismissals.94 In short, the concept of dismissal in EU law seems to correspond to a significant and
substantial disadvantage for the worker, in which the actual effect of the measure takes precedence
over the formal qualification.95 Terminating a permanent assignment means separating a worker
from his habitual place of work. This can be seen as a substantial disadvantage for the worker,
particularly since, if the worker cannot be redeployed elsewhere, the loss of the assignment will
89. Case C-449/93, ECLI: EU: C:1995:420 (Rockfon), para. 32.
90. Cf. Bayreuther, F. (2016), ‘Der Leiharbeitnehmer im Kündigungsrecht’, Neue Zeitschrift für Arbeitsrecht (33), p. 1306.
91. Bundesarbeitsgericht 16 November 2017, 2 AZR 90/17 (A), para. 23. Idem Bayreuther (supra n. 90), p. 1306.
92. This view is supported by the Akavan case (Case C-44/08, ECLI: EU: C:2009:533) where the Court defined the
employer within the meaning of the Collective Redundancies Directive as ‘a natural or legal person who stands in an
employment relationship [emphasis added] with the workers who may be made redundant’ (para. 57). The Akavan case
concerned a mother company which did not fit that model. The fact that it could take decisions that were binding on the
daughter company did not give it the status of employer (para. 58).
93. Pujante Rivera; Case C-149/16, ECLI: EU: C:2017:708 (Socha); Case C-429/16, ECLI: EU: C:2017:711 (Ciupa). The
Court applies a similar, broad approach to the concept of dismissal in the Insolvency Directive; Case C-57/17, ECLI:
EU: C:2018:512 (Checa Honrado).
94. Art. 18 Directive on Transparent and Predictable Working Conditions. This provision concerns the protection against
dismissal of workers who have made use of the rights set out in this Directive.
95. Conclusion of Advocate General Kokott to the Pujante Rivera case (ECLI: EU: C:2015:544), para. 54; Laagland F.G.
& Lintsen I. (2020), ‘De Europese invloed op fundamenten van het Nederlandse arbeidsrecht: het ondeelbaarheids-
beginsel op de schop?’, Tijdschrift Recht en Arbeid (13) 8/9, p. 10. See also COM(92)127 final, p. 2: ‘The [Collective
Redundancies] Directive covers not only ‘‘dismissals’’ in the legal sense of the term but also job losses in other
circumstances’.
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likely lead to the termination of the employment contract by the contractual employer. In conclu-
sion, it is submitted that when a user undertaking terminates the assignment of a permanently
assigned worker, this termination qualifies as a dismissal by the (non-contractual) employer within
the meaning of the Collective Redundancies Directive.
The scope for diverging national interpretations of the employer
Finally, an important question is, if the notion of ‘employer’ in EU law is indeed an autonomous
concept, what scope do Member States have to adopt or maintain a diverging definition of the
employer when applying or implementing EU law? As regards the objective conflict of law
Regulations, these Regulations are binding in their entirety and leave no room for diverging
national interpretations.96 The same cannot be said of social policy Directives. All social policy
Directives aim to protect, inter alia, the social rights of workers.97 When implementing these
Directives, the Member States may not diverge from the EU approach to the concept of the
employer, if doing so is to the disadvantage of the worker. On the other hand, the minimum
character of social policy Directives leaves the Member States free to extend the definition of the
employer to increase the protection of the workers concerned. For example, for the purpose of
attributing the employer obligations laid down in the Framework Directive on Occupational Health
and Safety, some Member States (e.g. Italy, the Netherlands) define the owner of the undertaking
in which work is performed as the ‘employer’, regardless of the existence of an employment
contract with the workers employed there.98 This goes further than the system envisaged by the
Framework Directive on Occupational Health and Safety and Directive 91/383/EEG (see supra
section 4.1) but increases the protection of the workers concerned, as it ensures that the entity
responsible for ensuring health and safety in the workplace is the entity who has the actual
authority over that workplace.
However, the minimum character of social policy Directives does not imply that the freedom of
Member States to extend their approach to the employer is unlimited. Over the years, it has become
clear that national labour law must conform with the market freedoms as laid down in the TFEU and
the freedom to conduct a business as laid down in Article 16 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of
the EU (hereafter: ‘CFREU’). These limits apply, irrespective of whether the national legislation falls
in or outside the scope of a European Directive.99 Although extending the scope of the concept of the
employer is undoubtedly a legitimate means to ensure a certain level of worker protection, an overly
extensive interpretation of the concept of the employer runs the risk of conflicting with the limits set
by these economic rights.100 In this regard, two particular risks are identified.
96. Nevertheless, the significance of an autonomous concept of the employer in these Regulations must not be overstated.
The choice of law rules in these Regulations generally only determine the applicable national law and do not
determine the material content of that law. As such, the qualification of an entity as ‘employer’ for the purpose of
determining the applicable law does not automatically mean that the employer status of that entity falls within the
scope of the applicable national law. For instance, although Dutch social security law applied to the drivers in AFMB,
Dutch social security law may still identify AFMB as the employer, with the result that not the Dutch transport
companies, but AFMB, would be obliged to pay social security contributions in the Netherlands.
97. Art. 151 TFEU. This is no different for social policy Directives that were enacted on a different legal basis (like Art.
115 TFEU), like the Transfer of Undertaking Directive.
98. Zwemmer (supra n. 63), pp. 43, 53-56; Ales (supra n. 75), pp. 261-262.
99. See, in more detail, Laagland (supra n. 68), pp. 63-67.
100. For a similar risk with regard to the worker concept, see Laagland (supra n. 68), pp. 63-64.
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First, identifying the user undertaking as the employer in a situation of cross-border posting may
conflict with the freedom to provide a service (Article 56 TFEU). This becomes particularly clear
when taking a closer look at the PWD. The PWD regulates which law applies to the employment
contract of cross-border posted workers within the EU. It is not based on the free movement of
workers but on the freedom of employers to provide a service in another Member State, for the
purpose of which the employer temporary posts one or more of his workers to that State.101 The
PWD strikes a balance between the freedom of services and the legitimate interest of the receiving
Member State to guarantee a minimum level of working conditions to all workers employed on its
territory.102 In contrast, labelling the user undertaking (the entity that receives the service) as the
employer brings the worker under the full scope of the labour law of the receiving State,103 thereby
evading the carefully constructed balance of the PWD.104 This jeopardises the useful effect of the
PWD and, by extension, restricts the freedom of services. So, what limits do the freedom of
services and the PWD impose on the national definition of employer in the case of cross-border
posting? The answer to this question may be found in Article 1(3) PWD. Article 1(3) PWD
stipulates that the applicability of the PWD is conditional on ‘the existence of an employment
relationship between the undertaking making the posting and the worker during the period of
posting’.105 Though it concerns different pieces of EU legislation, this wording is reminiscent
of the posting provision of Article 12(1) Regulation 883/2004, from which the Court drew heavy
inspiration to define the employer in AFMB. With this in mind, it may be argued that the Court’s
definition of employer in AFMB applies to the concept of ‘employment relationship’ in the PWD.
This would mean that if the user undertaking is the employer within the meaning of AFMB, the
PWD does not apply and the receiving Member State is free to identify the user undertaking as the
employer for the purpose of its national law. On the flip side of the coin, if the AFMB criteria do not
identify the user undertaking as the employer, the Member States are not competent to do so either
(as far as the posting occurs within the framework of providing a cross-border service). In a series
of landmark cases – the most famous being the Laval ruling106 – the Court ruled that the level of
protection established by the PWD is to be understood as a ceiling for the protection awarded to
posted workers, as conditions going above or beyond those of the PWD would constitute unjus-
tified restrictions of the freedom of services. By extension, it may be argued that a Member State
that goes beyond the definition of employer as interpreted by the Court in AFMB exceeds the
101. In case of temporary agency work, the posting of the worker(s) is the service; Danieli (supra n. 40), para. 27 and case
law cited.
102. For a more detailed account of the background to the PWD, see Rocca, M. (2015), Posting of Workers and Collective
Labour Law: There and Back Again. Between Internal Market and Fundamental Rights (Antwerp, Intersentia), pp.
113-142.
103. Assuming that the employment relationship between the worker and the user undertaking is limited to the work
performed for the user undertaking in the receiving Member State, the law of that State will apply to their employment
relationship, on the basis of Art. 8(2) and 10(1) Rome I Regulation.
104. The PWD does not apply if the posted worker has an employment contract with the user undertaking; COM(2002)654
final, pp. 36-37.
105. See also Case C-16/18, ECLI: EU: C:2019:1110 (Dobersberger), para. 29; Danieli (supra n. 40), para. 25; Case C-
307/09, ECLI: EU: C:2011:64 (Vicoplus), para. 44; Case C-346/06, ECLI: EU: C:2008:189 (Rüffert), para. 19. The
PWD also applies if the worker is posted indirectly by his employer to the receiving State, i.e. by an undertaking to
which the worker has been posted; Danieli (supra n. 40), para. 30 ff.; Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in the
Dobersberger case (ECLI: EU: C:2019:638), paras. 76-83.
106. Case C-341/05, ECLI: EU: C:2007:809 (Laval).
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ceiling of worker protection allowed by the PWD107 and therefore unjustifiably restricts the
freedom of services.108
Secondly, the market freedoms may restrict the scope of the concept of the employer in national
law provisions that fall outside the scope of a European Directive. In this regard, it is relevant to
consider the national approach to the concept of the employer in corporate groups. With regard to
corporate groups, several Member States (e.g. France, Belgium, Italy, Spain) take a broad approach
to the concept. If certain criteria are met (e.g. the mother company exercises a high level of control
over its daughter company), the mother company is regarded as the ‘co-employer’ of the employ-
ees of the daughter company. As a result, the corporate veil is pierced and the mother company is
directly and jointly responsible for all or for specific employer obligations, like paying redundancy
payments or reinstating workers who are unlawfully dismissed.109 Piercing the corporate veil,
specifically the principle of limited liability, runs the risk of conflicting with the market freedoms,
specifically the freedom of establishment (Article 49 TFEU).110 The freedom of establishment
aims to guarantee, inter alia, that mother companies can freely establish themselves, through their
daughter companies, throughout the EU.111 Piercing the corporate veil by identifying a foreign
mother company as ‘co-employer’ is likely to restrict this freedom, in particular since the principle
of limited liability is often an important motive for establishing a daughter company in another
Member State.112 In that case, it must be assessed whether co-employment is a suitable and
necessary restriction of free movement. In this regard, the development of co-employment in
France is of particular interest. In France, to be recognised as co-employer, the employees must
establish either the existence of a relation of subordination, or a ‘confusion of activity, direction
and interest’ between the mother company and the subsidiary. With this second criterion, it is
107. The same cannot be said of the TAWD. Although Art. 4 TAWD contains a general prohibition on restrictions of
temporary agency work, this provision (and, by extension, the TAWD) does not seem to oblige Member States to
remove such restrictions; see Case C-533/13, ECLI: EU: C:2015:173 (AKT) and the analysis of that judgment in
Davies, A.C.L. (2016), ‘The legal nature of the duty to review prohibitions or restrictions on the use of temporary
agency work: AKT’, Common Market Law Rev. (53), pp. 493-508. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded that the Court
would rule that identifying the user undertaking as the employer in a situation of temporary agency work interferes
with the useful effect of the TAWD, specifically when interpreted in light of Art. 16 CFREU, which encompasses,
inter alia, the freedom of contract, including the freedom to choose with whom to do business; Case C-283/11, ECLI:
EU: C:2013:28 (Sky Österreich), para. 43.
108. This does not imply that the receiving Member State may not attribute specific employer obligations to the user
undertaking. This is illustrated by the Wolff & Müller case (Case C-60/03, ECLI: EU: C:2004:610), in which the Court
allowed the receiving State to hold sub-contractors jointly liable for the payment of the minimum wage. On the basis
of Art. 3(1)(a) PWD, the posted worker is entitled to the minimum wage (since the revision: remuneration) of the
receiving State. The Court held that the joint liability objectively ensured the protection of the posted worker and was
therefore a suitable measure to enforce the PWD and, thus, a proportionate restriction of the freedom of services.
109. For different examples in national law, see Lokiec (supra n. 53), pp. 77-79; Laulom, S. (2017), ‘Reconsidering the
Notion of ‘Employer’ in the Era of the Fissured Workplace: Responses to Fissuring in French Labour Law’, in:
Blanpain & Hendrickx (eds.) (supra n. 2), pp. 138-139; Álvarez Alonso, D. (2017), ‘Labor Law and ‘‘Atomization of
Work’’: Legal Responses to the ‘‘Fissured Workplace’’ in Spain’, in: Blanpain & Hendrickx (eds.) (supra n. 2), pp.
164-165; Wouters, M. (2019), ‘The classification of employment relationships in Belgium’, ELLJ (10), pp. 215-216.
110. Case C-81/09, ECLI: EU: C:2010:622 (Idryma Typou); see also Schön W. (2000), ‘Zweigniederlassung und Toch-
tergesellschaft - ein Grundsatz des Europäischen Unternehmensrechts’, Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht
(7), pp. 281-291; Sørensen K.E. (2015), ‘Groups of companies in the case law of the Court of Justice of the European
Union’, Nordic & European Company Law LSN Research Paper Series, No. 15-02, pp. 25-28.
111. Case C-170/05, ECLI: EU: C:2006:783 (Denkavit); Case C-201/15, ECLI: EU: C:2016:972 (AGET Iraklis).
112. Bartman, S.M., Dorresteijn, A.F.M. & Olaerts, M. (2016), Van het concern (Deventer, Kluwer), pp. 12-13.
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possible for employees to bring employment claims against a mother company without having to
prove a hierarchical relationship with the mother company.113 Through a permissive interpretation
of the word ‘confusion’, the French courts interpreted the concept of co-employment broadly for
several years. For example, co-employment was accepted on the basis that the directors of the
subsidiary came from the group and that the foreign mother company had taken managerial
decisions affecting the future of the subsidiary.114 As these are circumstances that are common
to many corporate groups, it became unclear to what extent corporate groups could extend their
group policies to French subsidiaries without accruing employer liabilities.115 It can be argued that
such an expansive approach to co-employment unjustifiably restricts the freedom of establishment.
Having a certain degree of control over subsidiaries is inherent to corporate groups. More impor-
tantly, it is a precondition for shareholders (including mother companies) to fall under the scope of
the freedom of establishment.116 With this in mind, connecting multiple employer obligations to
the mere exercise of that control arguably disproportionately favours worker protection over the
principle of limited liability. Moreover, the explicit disregard of a link of subordination between
the mother company and the employee does not sit well with the Court’s emphasis on the existence
of a hierarchical relationship in AFMB.117 From a free movement perspective, it can therefore be
seen as a positive and necessary development that the Cour de Cassation (French Supreme Court)
decided that co-employment cannot be established on the basis of the coordination and supervision
of economic actions and decisions alone. To reassure corporate groups, it limited co-employment
to ‘abnormal relationships’ between mother companies and subsidiaries, in which the subsidiary
acts as a mere establishment deprived of any decision-making authority and management pow-
ers.118 In these circumstances, establishing co-employment can be seen as a suitable and propor-
tionate restriction of the freedom of establishment. The circumstances mirror the situation in which
the mother company has set up an establishment instead of a daughter company, in which case
(since an establishment lacks legal personality) the mother company will have acted as the legal
employer of the employees.
Conclusion
This contribution analysed the outlines of the concept of the employer in EU law. The AFMB
decision can be seen as a first step towards an autonomous, European concept of the employer.
This concept can be described as ‘uniform in its functionality’: in EU law, the national concept of
the employer is never absolute, but the circumstances and the way in which the national concept
must be set aside depend on the context and the objective of the European legislation in question.
As a first step to identify the employer in a provision of EU law, it can be inferred from the existing
113. Cour de Cassation 25 September 2013, No. 12-14.353.
114. Toulouse Court of Appeal 7 February 2013, No. 12-04.150.
115. Ottoway, C. & Harang, G-L. (2015), ‘Should We Really Be Afraid of Co-employment in Groups of Companies from a
French Legal Perspective?’, International Corporate Rescue (12), pp. 291-292.
116. Idryma Typou (supra n. 110), paras. 47-51 and case law cited.
117. This view is supported by the Akavan case (supra n. 92), where the Court held, for the purpose of the Collective
Redundancies Directive, that the fact that a mother company can take decisions that are binding on the daughter
company does not give that mother company the status of employer (para. 58).
118. Cour de Cassation 2 July 2014, No. 12-15.208; Lokiec (supra n. 53), p. 78; Laulom (supra n. 109), p. 139.
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case law that account should be taken of whether the legislation in question focuses on the identity
of the ‘employer’ or on that of the economic organisation in which work is performed.
The Court’s functional approach to the employer reinforces the recognition in many Member
States that the contractual approach to the employer is not absolute. More specifically, it sup-
ports the growing argumentative discourse that, since employer functions can be shared between
entities, employer obligations should be attributed accordingly.119 Moreover, AFMB demon-
strates that Member States should not underestimate the significance of EU law when defining or
rethinking their approach to the employer. To define the employer, each Member State has so far
struck its own balance between the freedom of contract and the principle that substance should
prevail over form. The outcome of this balancing act differs for each Member State, which
relates, in particular, to diverging degrees of acceptance of multiparty working arrangements.120
EU law partly harmonises the outcome of these balancing exercises. The EU social acquis sets
minimum requirements for when substance should prevail over form. At the same time, the
market freedoms limit the competence of the Member States to adopt an overly extensive
approach to the employer. Thus, to some extent EU law sets both an upper and lower limit to
the concept of employer in national law.
Yet – and as a final note of thought – it can be deduced from the existing case law that these
limits should not be overstated. Although this contribution has put forward several more specific
viewpoints, the Court’s definition of the employer in AFMB is relatively vague. Other than that
purely artificial arrangements are not accepted and that regard should be had of ‘all relevant
circumstances’, national courts retain a certain degree of latitude in deciding who they consider
to be the ‘true’ employer within the meaning of Regulation 883/2004. Similarly, the Court did not
explain in Albron when an assignment is to be considered ‘permanent’ for the purpose of attribut-
ing an employee to a user undertaking. Though the lack of specific guidance is understandable in
light of the facts of the particular cases, the result is that it is up to national courts to further
interpret a European definition of the employer (or ask an additional preliminary question). This
leads to legal uncertainty. Moreover, it may entice national courts to colour a European definition
of the employer in light of their own, national views.121 As a result, despite the Court’s pursuit of
an autonomous employer concept, different interpretations of that concept can be upheld, which in
turn may lead to diverging levels of worker protection throughout the EU. This goes for the
minimum requirements set by the EU social acquis, but also blurs the outer limits posed by the
market freedoms, since the Court’s interpretation of the employer in EU labour law may impact its
stance on national employer definitions in light of the market freedoms (particularly in the context
of cross-border posting). In this light, it is desirable that, when the Court decides to give the
concept of employer in a provision of EU law an autonomous interpretation, the Court defines
that concept as specifically as possible. Only then may the true extent of the European concept of
the employer reveal itself.
119. See, notably, Prassl (supra n. 2); Hauben, Lenaerts & Kraatz (supra n. 8), pp. 7-8.
120. Corazza & Razzolini (supra n. 2), p. 5-9, 14; Ratti, L. (2009), ‘Agency Work and the Idea of Dual Employership: A
Comparative Perspective’, WP CSDLE ‘Massimo D’Antona’.INT–68/2009, p. 9 ff.
121. This tendency may be visible with regard to the Albron ruling (supra n. 3), which is not interpreted the same in
each Member State; see e.g. Beltzer, R.M. (2015), ‘Intraconcerndetachering’, in: Beltzer, Laagland & Van den Berg
(supra n. 10), pp. 42-49; Hamann, W. (2018), ‘AÜG § 1’, in: Schüren, P. & Hamann, W. (eds.), Arbeitneh-
merüberlassungsgesetz (München, C.H. Beck), paras. 265-266.
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